## SYSMON + ATT&CK to feed your SIEM

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This presentation is for educational purposes only.


Before doing anything you should consult your corporate InfoSec authority.

## Whoami



Raphael FrancoeurThreat Detection Engineer

@ Canada Life- SANS: GCIA,GCWN,GCDA- 3 little ninias



## 02 Why you should use it ?

<mark>04</mark> Q & A "The path that leads to what we truly desire is long and difficult, but only by following that path do we achieve our goal."

## - Master Splinter

## <u>What is it ?</u>

01

Maybe you know, maybe you don't, but lets make sure.



## IF SOC's were SANDWICHES

### WITHOUT Sysmon

## WITH Sysmon





### **SYSMON**

### https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon



## ION-STORM / SYSMON-CONFIG https://github.com/ion-storm/sysmon-config



FORK of SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config

## This is the install plan

## PS C:\temp> sysmon -i "sysmonconfig.xml"

start-process wevtutil.exe -ArgumentList "sl Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational /ms:2147483648" -wait


## The update plan

& c:\windows\sysmon.exe -c .\sysmonconfig\_noFileBlocks\_allDNS.xml



The backout plan

## & c:\windows\sysmon.exe −u force



| <sysmon schemaversion="4.90"></sysmon>  |   |
|---|---|
| <hashalgorithms>md5,sha1,sha256,imphash</hashalgorithms>  |   |
| <checkrevocation></checkrevocation>   |   |
| <eventfiltering></eventfiltering>   | he config   |
| SYSMON EVENT ID 1 : PROCESS CREATION [ProcessCreate]  |   |
| <rulegroup grouprelation="or" name="RG=ProcessCreate Include Group"></rulegroup>  |   |
| <pre>ProcessCreate onmatch="include"&gt;</pre>  |   |
| MITRE ATT&CK TACTIC: Reconnaissance   |   |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Active Scanning   |   |
| <rule groupre<="" name="Attack=T1595.002,Technique=Vulnerability Scanning,Tacti&lt;/th&gt;&lt;td&gt;ic=Reconnaissance,DS=Process: Process Creation,Level=3,Alert=Nessus Scan Detected,Risk=100" td=""></rule> |   |
| <pre><parentcommandline condition="contains any">TEMP\nessus_;nessus</parentcommandline></pre>  | <pre>s_task_list</pre>  |
| <pre><commandline condition="contains any">TEMP\nessus_;nessus_task_</commandline></pre>  | _list   |
|   |   |
|   | ic=Reconnaissance,DS=Process: Process Creation,Level=4,Alert=Port Scan Tool Detected,Risk=100" grou |
| <pre><commandline condition="contains any">rcpping;tcpping;tcping;rc</commandline></pre>  | outerscan;grabff;Port-Scan;netscan;\nmap;ipscan;nacmdline.exe                                       |
|   | rcpping.exe;nc.exe;nc64.exe;netcat.exe;ncat.exe;nmap.exe;zenmap.exe;advanced_ip_scanner.exe         |
| <pre><product condition="contains any">Network Scanner;Advanced IP S</product></pre>  | Scanner   |
|   |   |
|   | erv,DS=Process: Process Creation,Level=4,Alert=ADFind.exe Discovery,Risk=100" groupRelation="or">   |
| <originalfilename condition="contains">adfind<td>Alant notch inve modification</td></originalfilename>  | Alant notch inve modification   |
| <product condition="contains">adfind</product>  | Alert=netsh ipv6 modification   |
| <pre><commandline condition="contains any">-gcb -sc;/gcb /sc;-f (obj</commandline></pre>  | ectcategory=;/T (objectcategory=;trustump   |
|   |   |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Gather Victim Host Information  | ="Attack=T1629.003  |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Gather Victim Identity Information  |   |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Gather Victim Network Information   | Technique=Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools  |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Gather Victim Org Information   | rechnique-impuir berenses, bisable of hourry roois.   |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Phishing for Information  |   |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Search Closed Sources   | Tactic=Defense Evasion Level=2  |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Search Open Technical Databases   |   |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Search Open Websites/Domains  |   |
| MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUE: Search Victim-Owned Websites  | DS=Process: Process Creation  |
|   |   |

<!--MITRE ATT&CK TACTIC: Resource Development--</pre>

### The Schema (EID 1)

### \Sysmon64.exe" -s | out-file c:\temp\sysmon\_schema.xml

<manifest schemaversion="4.83" binaryversion="17">

#### <configuratic

<events>

<event name="SYSMONEVENT ERROR" value="255" level="Error" template="Error report" version="3">

<event name="SYSMONEVENT\_CREATE\_PROCESS" value="1" level="Informational" template="Process Create" rulename=
"ProcessCreate" ruledefault="include" version="5">

<data name="RuleName" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="UtcTime" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="ProcessGuid" inType="win:GUID" />

<data name="ProcessId" inType="win:UInt32" outType="win:PID" />

<data name="Image" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="FileVersion" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="Description" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="Product" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="Company" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="OriginalFileName" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="CommandLine" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="CurrentDirectory" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="User" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="LogonGuid" inType="win:GUID" />

<data name="LogonId" inType="win:HexInt64" />

<data name="TerminalSessionId" inType="win:UInt32" />

<data name="IntegrityLevel" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="Hashes" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="ParentProcessGuid" inType="win:GUID" />

<data name="ParentProcessId" inType="win:UInt32" outType="win:PID" />

<data name="ParentImage" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="ParentCommandLine" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

<data name="ParentUser" inType="win:UnicodeString" outType="xs:string" />

</event>

<event name="SYSMONEVENT FILE TIME" value="2" level="Informational" template="File creation time changed" rul</pre>

### The Raw Event (EID 1)

#### - <EventData>

<Data Name="RuleName">Attack=T1016,Technique=System Network Configuration Discovery,Tactic=Discovery,DS=Process: Process Creation,Level=0,Desc=ipconfig discovery,Risk=20</Data> <Data Name="UtcTime">2023-10-26 03:50:06.544</Data> <Data Name="ProcessGuid">{35db2687-e1ee-6539-a7c3-03000006d00} <Data Name="ProcessId">25568</Data> <Data Name="Image">C:\Windows\System32\ipconfig.exe</Data> <Data Name="FileVersion">10.0.19041.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)</Data> <Data Name="Description">IP Configuration Utility</Data> <Data Name="Product">Microsoft® Windows® Operating System</Data> <Data Name="Company">Microsoft Corporation</Data> <Data Name="OriginalFileName">ipconfig.exe</Data> <Data Name="CommandLine">C:\WINDOWS\Sysnative\ipconfig.exe /flushdns</Data> <Data Name="CurrentDirectory">C:\WINDOWS\system32\</Data> <Data Name="User">NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM</Data> <Data Name="LogonGuid">{35db2687-1c25-651b-e703-00000000000} <Data Name="LogonId">0x3e7</Data> <Data Name="TerminalSessionId">0</Data> <Data Name="IntegrityLevel">System</Data> <Data Name="Hashes">SHA1=D9BBB4E4900FF03B0486FAC32768170249DAD82D,MD5=62F170FB07FDBB79CEB7147101406EB8,SHA256=53E000F <Data Name="ParentProcessGuid">{35db2687-2500-651b-f301-00000006d00}</Data> <Data Name="ParentProcessId">10592</Data>

<Data Name="ParentImage">C:\Program Files (x86)\Zscaler\ZSATunnel\ZSATunnel.exe</Data>

<Data Name="ParentCommandLine">"C:\Program Files (x86)\Zscaler\ZSATunnel\ZSATunnel.exe"</Data>

<Data Name="ParentUser">NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM</Data>

</EventData>

#### </Event>

## 02 Why you should use

**it ?** Don't be scared, it's fun.

## Some Why's

**Unveil the Underbelly :** Sysmon is your secret weapon to unveil the mysterious inner workings of your Windows systems. \* It's like X-ray vision for your computers! \*

**Process Ninja Skills :** Sysmon logs every move processes make, from spawning to executing cryptic commands. \*It's like having a play-by-play of a hacker's tactics. \*

**Registry Scribe :** Every change in the Windows registry gets recorded. \*It's like having a scribe documenting the whispers of your system's heart.\*

**Craft Your Rules :** Customize Sysmon rules to hunt down specific behaviors or threats. \*It's like having a magic wand to summon your desired security spells.\*

**Regulatory Sorcery :** Sysmon is your magic potion to comply with security standards and regulations. Stay on the right side of the compliance wizards.

**Threat Hunter's Companion :** With Sysmon, you're not just a security analyst; you're a digital Sherlock Holmes, hunting for hidden cyber criminals / idiots .

| Reconnaissance<br>10 techniques  | Resource<br>Development<br>8 techniques  | Initial Access<br>9 techniques           | Execution<br>14 techniques                                   | Persistence<br>19 techniques              | Privilege<br>Escalation<br>13 techniques | <b>Defense Evasion</b><br>42 techniques           | Credential<br>Access<br>17 techniques     | Discovery<br>31 techniques                   | Lateral<br>Movement<br>9 techniques   | Collection<br>17 techniques                      | Command and<br>Control<br>16 techniques | Exfiltration<br>9 techniques                              | Impact<br>13 techniques             |
|--|--|--|--|---|--|---|---|--|---------------------------------------|--|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| Active Scanning (1/3)  | Acquire Access   | Drive-by<br>Compromise                   | Cloud Administration<br>Command                              | Account<br>Manipulation <sub>.(0/5)</sub> | Abuse Elevation<br>Control<br>Mechanism  | Abuse Elevation Control<br>Mechanism (1/4)        | Adversary-in-<br>the-Middle (0/3)         | Account Discovery (0/4)                      | Exploitation of<br>Remote<br>Services | Adversary-in-<br>the-Middle <sub>(0/3)</sub>     | Application Layer<br>Protocol (0/4)     | Automated<br>Exfiltration (0/1)                           | Account Access<br>Removal           |
| Information (0/4)  | Infrastructure (0/8)   | Exploit Public-<br>Facing                | Command and<br>Scripting                                     | BITS Jobs                                 | Mechanism (1/4)<br>Access Token          | Access Token<br>Manipulation                      | Brute Force (0/4)                         | I Discovery                                  | Internal                              | Archive Collected                                | Communication<br>Through                | Data Transfer<br>Size Limits                              | Data Destruction                    |
| Gather Victim Identity<br>Information (0/3)  | Compromise<br>Accounts (0/3)   | Application<br>External Remote           | Interpreter (5/9)  | Boot or Logon<br>Autostart<br>Ex          | Manipulatic                              | <b>B M</b>  | Credentials from                          | Browser Information<br>Discovery             | Spearphishing                         | Audio Capture                                    | Removable<br>Media                      | Exfiltration Over<br>Alternative                          | Data Encrypted for<br>Impact        |
| Gather Victim Network<br>Information (0/6)   | Compromise<br>Infrastructure (1/7)   | Services                                 | Administration<br>Command                                    | Bo  |  |   |   |  | Transfer<br>Remote Service            | Automated<br>Collection                          | Data<br>Encoding (0/2)                  | Exfiltration Over   | Data<br>Manipulation (0/3)          |
| Gather Victim Org<br>Information (0/4)   | Develop<br>Capabilities (1/4)  | Additions                                | Deploy Container   | Schpts (0/5)                              | Initialization                           | D sh V ca quec de                                 | de  | Dashboard                                    | Session I<br>Hijacking (1/2)          | I Browser Session<br>Hijacking                   | Data<br>Obfuscation (0/3)               | C2 Channel  | Defacement (0/2)                    |
| Phishing for<br>Information (0/3)  | Establish<br>Accounts (0/3)  | Phishing (1/3)                           | Exploitation for<br>Client Execution                         | Browser<br>Extensions                     | Scripts (0/5)<br>Create or Modify        | Deploy Container                                  | Autrentication                            | Cloud Service Discovery                      | Remote<br>Services (5/7)              | Clipboard Data                                   | Dynamic<br>Resolution (0/3)             | Exfiltration Over<br>Other Network                        | Disk Wipe (0/2)                     |
| Search Closed<br>Sources (0/2)   | Obtain<br>Capabilities (0/6)   | Through<br>Removable Media               | Inter-Process<br>Communication (1/3)                         | Compromise<br>Client Software<br>Binary   | System<br>Process (1/4)                  | Direct Volume Access                              | Forge Web<br>Credentials (0/2)            | Cloud Storage Object<br>Discovery            | Replication<br>Through                | Data from Cloud<br>Storage                       | Encrypted<br>Channel (0/2)              | Exfiltration Over<br>Physical II                          | Service (0/4)                       |
| Search Open Technical<br>Databases (0/5)   | Stage<br>Capabilities (0/6)  | Supply Chain<br>Compromise (0/3)         | Native API<br>Scheduled                                      | Create<br>Account (0/3)                   | Domain Policy<br>Modification (1/2)      | Domain Policy<br>Modification (1/2)               | Input<br>Capture (1/4)                    | Container and Resource<br>Discovery          | Removable<br>Media                    | Data from<br>Configuration I<br>Repository       | Fallback<br>Channels                    | Medium <sub>(0/1)</sub><br>Exfiltration Over              | Corruption<br>Inhibit System        |
| Search Open<br>Websites/Domains  |  | Trusted<br>Relationship                  | Task/Job (2/5)<br>Serverless Execution                       | Create or Modify<br>System                | Escape to Host<br>Event Triggered        | Execution<br>Guardrails (0/1)                     | Modify<br>Authentication<br>Process (0/8) | Debugger Evasion<br>Device Driver Discovery  | Software<br>Deployment<br>Tools       | Data from<br>Information                         | Ingress Tool<br>Transfer                | Web II<br>Service (1/3)                                   | Recovery<br>Network Denial of       |
| Search Victim-Owned<br>Websites  | •  | Valid<br>Accounts <sub>(0/4)</sub>       | Shared Modules   | Process (1/4)<br>Event Triggered          | Execution (4/16)<br>Exploitation for     | Exploitation for Defense<br>Evasion               | Multi-Factor<br>Authentication            | Domain Trust Discovery                       | Taint Shared<br>Content               | Repositories <sub>(0/3)</sub><br>Data from Local | Multi-Stage<br>Channels                 | Scheduled<br>Transfer                                     | Service (0/2)<br>Resource Hijacking |
|  |  |  | Software<br>Deployment Tools                                 | Execution (4/16)<br>External Remote       | Privilege<br>Escalation                  | File and Directory<br>Permissions<br>Modification | Interception<br>Multi-Factor              | File and Directory<br>Discovery              | Use Alternate<br>Authentication       | System   | Non-Application<br>Layer Protocol       | Transfer Data to<br>Cloud Account                         | Service Stop                        |
|  |  |  | System Services (1/2)  | Services<br>Hijack Execution              | Hijack Execution<br>Flow (1/12)          | Hide Artifacts (1/10)                             | Authentication<br>Request<br>Generation   | Group Policy Discovery<br>Network Service    | Material (0/4)                        | Network Shared<br>Drive                          | Non-Standard<br>Port                    |   | System<br>Shutdown/Reboot           |
|  |  |  | Windows<br>Management  | Flow (1/12)<br>Implant Internal           | Process<br>Injection (1/12)              | II Flow (1/12)                                    | Network<br>Sniffing                       | Discovery<br>Network Share                   |                                       | Data from<br>Removable<br>Media                  | Protocol<br>Tunneling                   |   |                                     |
| 3  |  |  | Instrumentation  | Image<br>Modify                           | Scheduled<br>Task/Job (2/5)              | Impair Defenses (5/10)<br>Indicator Removal (1/0) | OS Credential<br>Dumping (2)8             | Discovery<br>Network Sniffing                |                                       | Data Staged (0/2)                                | Proxy (1/4)                             |   |                                     |
| to to the second   |  |  |  | Authentication I<br>Process (0/8)         | Valid Accounts (0/4)                     | Indirect Command<br>Execution                     | Steal<br>Application                      | Password Policy<br>Discovery                 |                                       | Email<br>Collection (0/3)                        | Remote Access<br>Software               |   |                                     |
| Annual Contract of |  |  |  | Office Application<br>Startup (0/6)       | 1  | Masquerading (2/8)                                | Access Token<br>Steal or Forge            | Peripheral Device<br>Discovery               |                                       | Input<br>Capture <sub>(1/4)</sub>                | Traffic<br>Signaling <sub>(0/2)</sub>   |   |                                     |
| A VCCON  | 100 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10  |  |  | Pre-OS Boot (0/5)                         | 1  | Modify Authentication<br>Process (0/8)            | Authentication<br>Certificates            | Permission Groups<br>Discovery               |                                       | Screen Capture<br>Video Capture                  | Web Service (0/3)                       | C Sat   |                                     |
| is a second s  | A Contraction of the second se | 20 2                                     |  | Task/Job (2/5)                            |  | Modify Cloud Compute I<br>Infrastructure (0/4)    | Steal or Forge<br>Kerberos<br>Tickets     | Process Discovery                            | •                                     |  | //                                      | System  | Nation K Collect                    |
|  | Service States   | Toron Internation                        |  | 0   |  | Modify Registry<br>Modify System                  | Steal Web<br>Session Cookie               | Query Registry<br>Remote System              |                                       |  |   | ACOUNT SE   | NOTK CISC                           |
|  | and the second s | non un                                   |  | Signaling (0/2)                           |  | Image (0/2)                                       | Unsecured                                 | Discovery                                    |                                       |  | Nasion                                  | Covery Covery   | overy                               |
|  |  | Topological and the second               | Telut III  | Valid Accounts (0/4)                      | 1  | Network Boundary<br>Bridging (0/1)                | Credentials (0/8)                         | Software Discovery (0/1) System Information  | <u> </u>                              |  | tions                                   | Sommer Nice<br>Meri<br>Stern Service<br>Sterner Viscovery |                                     |
|  |  | C. C | boyn turz<br>counter<br>boncounter<br>benezione<br>benezione |   |  | Obfuscated Files or<br>Information (1/11)         |   | Discovery<br>System Location                 |                                       |  | System 11.<br>System 11.<br>Eussion     | Abox Very   |                                     |
|  |  |  | CO CO CO   |   |  | Plist File Modification                           |   | Discovery <sub>(0/1)</sub>                   |                                       |  |   | (e)   |                                     |
|  |  |  |  |   |  | Pre-OS Boot (0/5)<br>Process Injection (1/12)     |   | System Network<br>Configuration<br>Discovery | 1                                     |  |   |   |                                     |



## O3 <u>How we use</u> If you trigger, You get

\$visibility++

The config levels


DEFCON 4 : Just Mitre DEFCON 3 : More DNS <DnsQuery onmatch="exclude" />

**DEFCON 2 : More DNS + Process** 

**DEFCON 1 :** More DNS + Process + Clipboard Changes (gloves are off)

## The tech

| Endpoint<br>Management<br>Solution  | <mark>C2</mark>   | EDR   | SIEM          |
|---|---|---|---------------|
| SCCM:<br>Coordinates the<br>installs<br>report service<br>status and config<br>hashes<br>Troubleshoot<br>stragglers | Protected<br>middle box<br>to host<br>Sysmon's<br>config off-<br>prem since<br><b>WFH</b> is a<br>thing | HX equipped<br>with<br>EventStream<br>er 2.0 and<br>ships Win<br>logs to SIEM | Trellix HELIX |



| Eventid | Category   | Total ↓ |
|---------|--|---------|
| з       | network connection detected (rule: networkconnect)     | 2438935 |
| 11      | file created (rule: filecreate)                        | 2252616 |
| 13      | registry value set (rule: registryevent)               | 1380796 |
| 22      | dns query (rule: dnsquery)                             | 587363  |
| 1       | process create (rule: processcreate)                   | 571903  |
| 7       | image loaded (rule: imageload)                         | 387801  |
| 10      | process accessed (rule: processaccess)                 | 97821   |
| 2       | file creation time changed (rule: filecreatetime)      | 59571   |
| 8       | createremotethread detected (rule: createremotethread) | 52632   |
| 6       | driver loaded (rule: driverload)                       | 23862   |
| 15      | file stream created (rule: filecreatestreamhash)       | 4208    |
| 255     |  | 347     |
| 25      | process tampering (rule: processtampering)             | 277     |
| 4       | sysmon service state changed                           | 151     |
| 16      | sysmon config state changed                            | 36      |
| 17      | pipe created (rule: pipeevent)                         | з       |

## False Positives ASR is a beach full of jellyfish

| [65 | 80] <b>powershell.exe</b> -EP Bypass -command "& {\sysmon.ps1; start-sysmon  | :onfigcheck}"  |                 |                 |              | $\sim$ |
|-----|--|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|--------|
| B   | Suspicious process executed PowerShell command                               |                | Media           | um • Detected   | New          |        |
| [95 | 12] <b>powershell.exe</b> -EP Bypass -command "& {\sysmon.ps1; start-sysmon. | :onfigcheck}"  |                 |                 |              | $\sim$ |
| B   | Suspicious process executed PowerShell command                               |                | Medie           | um • Detected   | • New        |        |
| D   | [9512] powershell.exe created file sysmon_config.exe                         |                |                 |                 |              | $\sim$ |
|     | Possible ransomware blocked  | Low            | • Detected      | Resolved (Fals  | se positive) |        |
| \$  | powershell.exe launch of sysmon_config.exe was blocked by the attack         | surface redu   | ction (ASR) rul | e "Use advanceo | l prote      | $\sim$ |
|     | Possible ransomware blocked  | Low            | • Detected      | Resolved (Fals  | se positive) |        |
| \$  | powershell.exe launch of sysmon_config.exe was blocked by the attack         | surface redu   | ction (ASR) rul | e "Use advanceo | l prote      | $\sim$ |
| \$  | powershell.exe launch of SYSMON~2.EXE was blocked by the attack su           | rface reductio | on (ASR) rule " | Use advanced p  | rotecti      | $\sim$ |
|     | Possible ransomware blocked  | Low            | • Detected      | Resolved (Fals  | se positive) |        |



04

## Questions and stuff

## Other cool stuff

<u>GitHub - SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config</u> <u>Sysmon configuration file template with default high-quality event tracing</u>



#### <u>GitHub - huntandhackett/sysmon-indepth:</u>

Understanding the operation and limitations of Sysmon's events FileBlock Events bypass – But... you should trip something else



<u>GitHub - olafhartong/sysmon-modular:</u> <u>A repository of sysmon configuration modules</u>



# THANKS

### For letting me out of the basement.

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